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Abstract
The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel 
between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve 
non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, 
they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to 
rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always 
responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility 
themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even 
have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely 
held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corpo-
rate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited 
rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit 
the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are 
engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some 
liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if 
artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for 
extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains 
very hypothetical.
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Group agency and artificial intelligence are two much discussed phenomena. The 
first consists in the fact that certain organized collectives, such as corporations, 
courts, and states, can function as intentional, goal-directed agents in their own 
right, over and above their individual members, often with considerable power and 
influence in the world.1 The second consists in the fact that computational or robotic 
systems increasingly display autonomous behaviours and cognitive and practical 
capacities similar in some respects to those traditionally associated with humans.2 
Examples range from driverless cars and self-navigating drones to autonomous sys-
tems in medical, financial, military, and other high-stakes settings. But while group 
agency and artificial intelligence have each received much attention, the two phe-
nomena are less often considered together. For any theorist of group agency, there 
is a noticeable parallel between them, and the aim of this exploratory paper is to 
review and discuss this parallel and to draw attention to some lessons for ethics and 
artificial intelligence that can be learnt from it. In particular, the established work on 
group agency offers a useful template for thinking through some of the moral and 
regulatory challenges raised by artificial intelligence. The parallel has been recog-
nized before, for instance in philosophical work by Migle Laukyte and in legal work 
by Lawrence Solum, and there is also much interest among artificial-intelligence 
researchers in the theme of multi-agent systems. But the parallel nonetheless war-
rants further discussion.3
In brief, the parallel lies in the fact that group agency and artificial intelligence 
each involve entities distinct from individual human beings that qualify as inten-
tional agents, capable of acting more or less autonomously in pursuit of certain 
goals and making a difference to the social world. If such non-human agents can 
make high-stakes decisions and perform actions on their own, we must answer some 
salient moral and regulatory questions, which are surprisingly similar in the corpo-
rate and artificial cases. Are corporate and artificial entities proper targets for the 
attribution of responsibility? Could they be moral agents, not just intentional ones? 
1 See, e.g., French (1984), Rovane (1997), Pettit (2001, Chap. 5, 2003), Tollefsen (2002, 2015), List and 
Pettit (2006, 2011), and Tuomela (2013). My discussion of group agency and group responsibility also 
draws on List (2019).
2 For overviews, see Russell and Norvig (2009), Winfield (2012), and Boden (2016).
3 The most extensive prior discussion of this parallel that I am aware of can be found in Laukyte (2014, 
2017), where themes similar to the present ones are addressed, drawing on the theory of group agency 
in List and Pettit (2011). In fact, the motivating example of an agent in the List-Pettit book itself is a 
robot. The parallel has been noted by others too. Recently, it appeared in an article by Hakli and Mäkelä 
(2019) arguing against the moral responsibility of both robots and collective agents, and it is alluded 
to in Bostrom’s work on superintelligence (2014), where collective intelligence is discussed alongside 
artificial superintelligence. An earlier discussion of the parallel from a legal perspective can be found in 
the work of Lawrence Solum on AI legal personhood, which is often modelled on the idea of corporate 
legal personhood. See especially Solum (1992), as well as follow-up contributions. There is sizeable lit-
erature in computer science and artificial intelligence on multi-agent systems, though that literature typi-
cally focuses more on the interplay between multiple agents and less on the question of the emergence 
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Could they engage in normative reasoning? Could they attain some kind of legal 
personhood status and have certain rights? Might we even have to care about them?
In Sections 2 and 3, I will introduce group agency and artificial intelligence in 
more detail. In Section 4, I will explain the parallel from a conceptual perspective 
and suggest that group agency can be interpreted as a special case of artificial intel-
ligence. In Sections 5 and 6, I will defend the view that, under certain conditions, 
artificial entities, like corporate agents, may qualify as bearers of responsibility and 
as holders of limited rights and legal personhood, and I will suggest that regulators 
should demand that when autonomous artificial systems are used in high-stakes set-
tings, they should be engineered to achieve moral—not just intentional—agency. As 
a backup, there should be liability-transfer arrangements in place. I will further raise 
the possibility that if we ever encountered phenomenally conscious AI systems, they 
might become candidates for a stronger moral status, but emphasize that this sce-
nario remains very hypothetical. In Section 7, finally, I will look at the bigger picture 
for ethics. One lesson is that if we take the arrival of novel, non-human agents seri-
ously, we may have to adjust some of our conventional anthropocentric approaches 
to morality and regulation so as to accommodate new loci of moral agency, respon-
sibility, and even rights.
2  Group Agency
Group agency is the phenomenon that suitably organized collectives can constitute 
intentional, goal-directed agents in their own right, over and above their individ-
ual members.4 Examples are firms and corporations, collegial courts, universities, 
churches, NGOs, and even states in their entirety. We tend to ascribe beliefs, desires, 
and other intentional attitudes to such entities, and treat them as loci of agency, 
sometimes even as artificial persons with obligations and a legal status, as distinct 
from the obligations and status of the people who belong to them.
At first, one might think that the ascription of agency and intentional attitudes 
to certain collectives is just a metaphor. Saying that Microsoft intends to increase 
profits is a shorthand for saying that the managers, board members, or share-
holders have this intention. Likewise, saying that the Roman Catholic Church is 
committed to certain values is a shorthand for saying that individual clergymen 
and other Catholics have those commitments. But there is a fairly straightfor-
ward indispensability argument for treating group agency as not just metaphori-
cal but real. According to this argument, a realist view about group agency is 
supported by the way we speak about many collectives in ordinary as well as 
social-scientific discourse. Our best social-scientific theories represent some col-
lective entities as goal-directed agents and explain their behaviour by using the 
same concepts and categories that we use to explain individual behaviour. For 
example, the theory of the firm in economics and “realist” theories of interna-
tional relations apply standard rational-actor models to firms and states. In fact, a 




profit-maximizing firm may be a more fitting case of a homo economicus, a self-
interested utility-maximizing rational agent, than any individual human being 
is. And strategic interactions between states, such as between the USA and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, are often modelled as games with strategi-
cally rational players. Similar points apply to the way political scientists think 
about parties and other organizations in politics.
The following argument summarizes the case for realism about group agency5:
Premise 1: The ascription of intentional agency to certain organized collectives 
is explanatorily indispensable if we wish to make sense of their behaviour.
Premise 2: If the ascription of some property to an entity is indispensable for 
explaining that entity’s behaviour, then we have a provisional justification for 
assuming that the entity really has that property.
Conclusion: We have a provisional justification for assuming that the collectives 
in question really have the property of intentional agency.
Premise 1 is a partly empirical and partly methodological claim about the social 
sciences. Premise 2 follows from a broader philosophical principle known as the 
“naturalistic ontological attitude”.6 That principle asserts that when we seek to 
answer ontological questions about which entities and properties are real in any 
given domain, we should consult our best scientific theories of that domain and be 
guided by considerations of explanatory indispensability. For example, the fact that 
postulating gravity and electromagnetic fields is indispensable for explaining certain 
physical phenomena gives us a provisional justification for thinking that gravity and 
electromagnetism are real. The justification is provisional, because there might still 
be special reasons for doubting our best scientific theories in the relevant domain, 
and those theories remain open to revision. But, in the absence of any contrary rea-
sons, we are warranted in taking the ontological commitments of our best theories at 
face value. If we accept Premises 1 and 2, then we must recognize group agency as a 
real phenomenon, at least provisionally.
To be sure, the present argument supports realism about group agency only for 
those collectives for which the ascription of agency is explanatorily indispensable. 
Firms and states are plausible examples. Unorganized collectives and random col-
lections, such as the collection of pedestrians on the street at this moment, would 
not qualify, as we would not get any explanatory benefit from ascribing agency to 
them. Similarly, not every case of cooperative or coordinated activity produces a 
group agent. When workers go on strike or villagers cooperate in providing some 
public good, the locus of agency remains the individual, even if the participants 
jointly bring about some aggregate effect, receive some gains from cooperation, 
and/or share certain intentions. Such collective or joint actions may be ingredients 
in the implementation of group agency (since organized collectives often rely on 
5 For an earlier version of this argument, see List (2018). The argument is also implicit in other works on 
group agency, including Tollefsen (2002) and List and Pettit (2011).
6 See, e.g., Quine (1977) and Fine (1984).
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collective or joint action), but collective or joint action alone is insufficient for 
group agency.7
We should finally note that even when a collective entity qualifies as a group 
agent, there may still be substantial pluralism, diversity, and disagreement 
among its members. The members may disagree, for instance, about what the 
group’s direction and objectives should be and how to achieve them, and while 
some of these disagreements may be resolved democratically, others may give 
rise to deep and ongoing conflicts and power struggles. This may, in turn, make 
a difference to the extent to which different members can be held responsible for 
the group’s actions; I will say more about corporate and member responsibil-
ity below. However, such disagreements do not count against the ascription of 
agency to the group as a whole, as long as this ascription remains indispensable 
for explaining the group’s overall behaviour from the perspective of a social-
scientific observer.8
3  Artificial Intelligence
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the increasingly ubiquitous phenomenon that 
some artificial (e.g., computational or robotic) systems display certain cogni-
tive capacities and/or autonomous agency that are in some respects analogous 
to the cognitive capacities and/or agency of humans or other animals. Defining 
artificial intelligence by reference to cognition or agency is very common. For 
instance, Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig define the subject of AI as “the study 
of agents that receive percepts from the environment and perform actions”.9 
Depending on which cognitive and agential capacities we focus on, we get more 
or less demanding definitions.
Examples of AI systems range from driverless cars, autonomous air vehicles 
(drones), medical helper robots, diagnostic devices, and financial trading systems, 
all the way to chess-playing computers, navigation devices, sophisticated vending 
machines, and even robots that can autonomously assemble IKEA furniture.10 The 
first few examples display greater autonomy and flexibility than the last few, which 
are more specialized.
A familiar distinction is that between “weak” and “strong” AI. “Strong AI” refers 
to machine intelligence comparable in sophistication, flexibility, and/or generality to 
human intelligence. “Weak AI” refers to machine intelligence “weaker” than human 
intelligence, for instance in the sense of being more specialized and less flexible. 
Strong AI on a par with human intelligence is not yet a reality (and a controversial 
7 On collective action, see, e.g., Olson (1965) and Ostrom (1990). On joint action, see, e.g., Bratman 
(1999, 2014), Gilbert (1989), and Tuomela (2007). On norm-governed multi-agent interactions, see also 
Boella and van der Torre (2007).
8 I thank a referee for prompting me to note this point.
9 See Russell and Norvig (2009). An account of AI in terms of agency can also be found in Laukyte 
(2014, 2017).




notion), and it is not clear how soon it is likely to be developed, if at all.11 The term 
“artificial superintelligence”, finally, refers to (so far, extremely hypothetical) AI 
systems whose capacities exceed human ones.12
Even though human-like AI is still elusive, the cognitive and agential 
capacities of AI systems are getting more sophisticated. As such systems 
attain greater autonomy and decision-making power, they raise new ethical 
and regulatory challenges. While early AI systems had only limited capacities 
and tended to be employed only in very controlled environments, we increas-
ingly face the arrival of AI systems that make high-stakes decisions and oper-
ate more autonomously in less controlled environments.13 If a system has only 
limited capacities, such as a robotic floor cleaner or a pre-programmed factory 
robot, or if its use has no serious spill-over effects beyond a restricted environ-
ment, as in the case of an automated train in a tunnel, then it does not give rise 
to qualitatively novel risks, compared to earlier technologies. Of course, the 
large-scale use of such systems may raise concerns about automation-driven 
job losses, but labour-market implications of new technologies are not unprec-
edented. By contrast, if an AI system operates relatively freely in a largely 
uncontrolled environment, as in the case of a driverless car or a fully autono-
mous drone, or if it can make high-stakes decisions on its own, as in the case 
of some medical, financial, and military systems, then the societal implica-
tions are qualitatively novel. We are then dealing with artefacts as genuine 
decision-makers, perhaps for the first time in human history. My focus in this 
paper is on such systems, which can make decisions with non-trivial stakes 
and operate relatively autonomously. The challenges raised by systems with 
more limited capacities and less autonomy are not my topic here, as they are 
less novel. Moreover, some of those weaker systems might be best viewed as 
advanced tools, not as genuinely autonomous agents.
4  The Key Parallel
The key parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence, as anticipated, 
lies in the fact that both phenomena involve entities distinct from individual human 
beings that qualify as goal-directed, “intentional” agents, with the ability to make 
a significant difference to the social world.14 As we will see later, those entities are 
not thereby guaranteed to qualify as moral agents too, which is a more demanding 
requirement than intentional agency alone.
11 Arguably, intelligence is best understood, not as one-dimensional, but as a cluster of capacities, with 
multiple, perhaps independent components: mathematical-logical, linguistic-verbal, musical, artistic-cre-
ative, motor-control, mind-reading etc. In line with this, Pinker (2018, p. 298) describes the concept of 
artificial general intelligence as “barely coherent”, also quoted by Aaronson at https:// www. scott aaron 
son. com/ blog/?p= 3654.
12 On artificial superintelligence, see, e.g., Chalmers (2010) and Bostrom (2014).
13 For discussion, see, e.g., Fisher et al. (2016).
14 As noted, this parallel is also discussed in Laukyte (2014, 2017).
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To develop the parallel, let me give a more precise definition of intentional 
agency. An intentional agent is an entity, within some environment, that meets at 
least three conditions15:
• It has representational states, which encode its “beliefs” about how things are.
• It has motivational states, which encode its “desires” or “goals” as to how it 
would like things to be.
• It has a capacity to interact with its environment on the basis of these states, so as 
to “act” in pursuit of its desires or goals in line with its beliefs.
To give a simple example: I believe that there is tea available in the kitchen; I 
desire to drink tea; I then act by going to the kitchen to get some tea. My action is 
explained—in fact, rationalized—by my beliefs and desires, and this pattern applies 
more generally.
Consistently with these conditions, agents can vary considerably in their capaci-
ties and sophistication. Their cognitive make-up can range from simple to complex. 
Human beings, the most familiar agents, have many psychological states beyond 
beliefs and desires. These include emotions, hopes, fears, and various subconscious 
mental states. Adult human beings also have the capacity for normative reasoning, 
on top of their more mundane capacities. But although human beings stand out, enti-
ties ranging from non-human animals to autonomous robots and organized collec-
tives can meet the agency conditions too. Behavioural ecologists often study animal 
behaviour using game theory and other theories involving the attribution of goal-
directed agency to the animals in question. And, as already noted, robots and AI 
systems, as well as corporate entities, are routinely viewed as agents in the relevant 
fields of study. So, we can certainly think of AI systems and group agents as inten-
tional agents of a non-biological sort.16
The parallel is further reinforced if we look at the most famous test for arti-
ficial intelligence, the “Turing Test”, and compare it with a prominent test for 
intentional agency, the “intentional stance” test, proposed by Daniel Dennett, 
which is often also applied to organized collectives. Let us begin with the Turing 
Test. Alan Turing argued that, to determine whether a system is “intelligent”, 
we should ask whether its behaviour leads a human observer to believe that it 
has human-like cognitive and agential capacities.17 Specifically, Turing suggested 
that we should replace the hard question “Can machines think?” with the more 
tractable question “Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well 
in the imitation game?”, where this means displaying behaviour that is indistin-
guishable, in an observer’s eyes, from that of an intelligent agent.18 Different 
15 I here build on List and Pettit (2011, Chap. 1) and List (2018). The notion of a “belief-desire agent” 
goes back to David Hume. For an influential account of “belief-desire-intention agency”, see Bratman 
(1987).
16 For a useful discussion, see also Dretske (1999).
17 See Turing (1950).




specifications of the imitation game correspond to different versions of this test. 
In Turing’s own version, the system must imitate the responses of a human inter-
locutor in written communication via an instant-messaging system. But other, 
less demanding versions are also conceivable. A Turing Test for self-driving cars 
might focus on whether a self-driving car can imitate the behaviour of a human-
operated car, even in complex traffic situations.
Let us compare this with the “intentional stance” test for agency.19 For Dennett, 
the criterion for whether an entity is an intentional agent is whether we can make 
sense of its behaviour by viewing it as an intentional agent. As he puts it, “[a]nything 
that is usefully and voluminously predictable from the intentional stance is, by 
definition, an intentional system.”20 Taking the “intentional stance” towards an entity 
means interpreting it as if it were an intentional agent and then explaining and pre-
dicting the entity’s behaviour on that basis. If this strategy works, the entity qualifies 
as an intentional agent; if not, then not. In the case of most inanimate systems, such 
as the solar system, a volcano, or the earth’s atmosphere, Dennett’s criterion is not 
met. We are better off taking a “physical stance” towards them: explaining them as 
systems governed by physical laws of nature and causal mechanisms. In the case of 
a human being or complex animal, however, Dennett’s criterion is met and vindi-
cates the presence of intentional agency. Similarly, as theorists of group agency have 
argued, firms, corporations, and other organized collectives are “usefully and volumi-
nously predictable from the intentional stance”.21
To see the similarity between the “intentional stance” test for agency and the 
Turing Test for intelligence, consider the relationship between:
 (i) successful interpretability as an agent, and
 (ii) doing well in a corresponding suitably specified imitation game.
One may expect (i) to be correlated with (ii). Any entity that is successfully inter-
pretable as an agent is likely to do well in an imitation game designed to test for the 
relevant agential capacities, and any entity that does well in this imitation game is 
likely to be successfully interpretable as an agent.
While both Turing and Dennett, in effect, propose interpretivist accounts of 
agency, I prefer a stronger realist account. On an interpretivist account, to be an 
agent is to be successfully interpretable as an agent. For me, interpretability as 
an agent is evidence for agency, but not conceptually the same as agency. On my 
stronger realist understanding, to be an agent is to satisfy the three conditions 
for agency introduced above. So, while from an interpretivist perspective suc-
cessful interpretability as an agent is constitutive of agency, for me it is merely 
indicative. That an entity is interpretable as an agent is good evidence for the 
hypothesis that it satisfies the agency conditions. Irrespective of whether we go 
with an interpretivist criterion or my preferred realist one, however, the fact that 
19 See Dennett (1987).
20 See Dennett (2009, p. 339).
21 See Tollefsen (2002, 2015) and List and Pettit (2011).
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sophisticated AI systems and suitably organized collectives meet criteria (i) or 
(ii) supports the claim that they each qualify as agents.22
In fact, group agents can be viewed as special cases of AI systems, where the 
“hardware” supporting their artificial intelligence is social rather than electronic. 
Rohit Parikh has coined the term “social software” to capture the idea that certain 
social phenomena can be understood as computational processes implemented in 
social systems. Parikh uses this term to refer to a broad range of social phenom-
ena, such as procedures and institutions, voting systems, and other mechanisms, 
and he does not focus on group agency.23 But, consistently with Parikh’s usage, the 
idea that group agents are socially implemented AI systems seems quite natural. As 
functionalist philosophers of mind have long argued, agency is a multiply realizable 
phenomenon: it can be realized by different “hardware systems”. The foregoing dis-
cussion illustrates that agency admits at least three different kinds of hardware: bio-
logical, as in the case of human beings and non-human animals; electronic, as in the 
case of robots and other AI systems; and social, as in the case of group agents. The 
boundaries between these three kinds of hardware may become increasingly blurred 
with the arrival of new (often controversial) technologies, from biological robotics 
and human enhancement to technologically augmented social systems.
While the main parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence consists 
in the instantiation of agency beyond the human individual, there are other paral-
lels too. Group agents and AI systems each have an internal architecture—social in 
the one case and computational in the other24—and it may be illuminating to com-
pare these architectures, perhaps applying the computational paradigm suggested 
by Parikh’s notion of social software. For instance, group agents and AI systems 
each tend to receive and aggregate inputs from different sources. To function well, 
they each need to satisfy certain rationality conditions at the level of the entity as a 
whole. They must each revise or update their beliefs in response to input from the 
environment. And so on. But these more technical parallels are not my focus here, 
and I just flag them as issues for further investigation. I want to move on to the 
moral and regulatory challenges raised by group agents and AI systems.
5  Challenges Related to Responsibility
5.1  Responsibility Gaps in Group Agency and AI
Group agents have considerable power and influence in the world and can cause sig-
nificant harms. States can wage wars and do many things that affect the lives of their 
24 In the case of group agency, French (1984) speaks of the “corporate internal decision structure” and 
List and Pettit (2011) speak of the group’s “organizational structure”, with a special emphasis on aggre-
gation functions. Parallels between the constitution of a social entity and that of a mind were also dis-
cussed by Minsky (1986).
22 Tollefsen (2015) defends group agency from an interpretivist perspective.




citizens and others. Likewise, corporations can affect people’s well-being through 
their business decisions and sometimes even cause disasters. Think of the Deepwa-
ter Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, caused by the drilling operations 
of a multinational corporation, or the deforestation caused by big industry. As is 
widely recognized, in the case of such harms, it is sometimes difficult to identify one 
or several individuals to whom all of the relevant responsibility can be attributed. 
The entirety of individual responsibility may intuitively fail to do justice to the full 
amount of the harm caused. If individuals are the only loci of responsibility, there 
is a shortfall of attributed responsibility: a “responsibility gap” or “responsibility 
void”.25
Philip Pettit gives the example of the Herald of Free Enterprise, a passenger ferry 
which sank in the English Channel in 1987, killing almost two hundred people.26 An 
inquiry concluded that the ferry company was very sloppy and had terrible safety 
procedures. In a commentator’s words, “[f]rom top to bottom the body corporate 
was infected with the disease of sloppiness”.27 Yet, despite a complex legal after-
math, no-one was found legally responsible to an intuitively appropriate extent. 
There was a shortfall in legally attributable responsibility, since the ferry company 
was not treated as a locus of responsible agency.28 The focus on individual responsi-
bility meant that the systemic failure at the collective level fell below the law’s radar 
screen. Johannes Himmelreich has suggested a helpful definition of a responsibility 
gap. A “responsibility gap” occurs whenever (i) an entity that is a “merely minimal 
agent” does X (an entity, such as the ferry company, which is able to act in some 
way but not deemed a locus of responsibility), (ii) no-one else is (fully) responsible 
for X, and (iii) if X had been the action of a normal human person, then this person 
would have been responsible for it.29
What should we say in such cases? One possibility is to deny that there is 
any form of responsibility other than individual responsibility. This would be to 
embrace responsibility gaps as regrettable but unavoidable occurrences. We would 
have to do our best to identify all the individuals who can be held responsible for 
at least parts of the harm caused, but if the entirety of their responsibility falls 
25 See, among others, Braham and van Hees (2011), Collins (2017, 2018), and Duijf (2018). On corpo-
rate responsibility more generally, see French (1984), Erskine (2001), Copp (2006), Pettit (2007), and 
List and Pettit (2011, Chap. 7), among others. For an overview, see Smiley (2017).
26 See Pettit (2007) and also List and Pettit (2011, Chap. 7).
27 See Colvin (1995), quoted also in Pettit (2007).
28 Ibid. Another example of an organizationally caused harm for which few or any individuals could be 
held responsible is the 1986 Challenger disaster, in which NASA’s space shuttle Challenger broke apart 
shortly after lift-off. The accident was caused by the failure of one particular material component of the 
vehicle (the “O-ring”) due to exceptionally cold launch conditions. The risk that this might happen was 
not identified by NASA’s risk assessment, something that might be viewed primarily as an organiza-
tional-level rather than individual-level failure. For a discussion of this case, see Amoore (2019). I thank 
a referee for suggesting this example.
29 See Himmelreich (2019). The wording here is adapted from p. 734. As Himmelreich acknowledges, 
the suggested definition would also identify actions of non-human animals as generating responsibility 
gaps, but like him, I set this issue aside and grant that not all responsibility gaps, on the present defini-
tion, are equally concerning.
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short of the responsibility we would have attributed if the harmful act had been 
committed by a human person, then we would have to accept that there is no more 
responsibility to be assigned. The situation would be akin to a natural disaster or 
fluke accident, where despite the regrettable harm no responsibility can be attrib-
uted to anyone, aside from possible responsibility for damage prevention and dis-
aster response.
However, there is an important difference between natural disasters and cor-
porate harms, which is highlighted by the “minimal agency” clause in the cited 
definition of a responsibility gap. While in a natural disaster the relevant harms 
cannot normally be traced back to intentional actions, corporate harms have an 
agential source: they stem from the actions of a group agent. For this reason, the-
orists of group agency often argue that we should treat corporate entities as loci 
of responsibility themselves, over and above their members. In the example of 
the ferry company, the responsibility gap might have been avoided by holding the 
company itself responsible for its sloppy procedures. This would have involved 
treating the company as more than a “merely minimal agent”. The assignment of 
corporate responsibility may be combined with appropriate sanctions at the cor-
porate level: targeting, for instance, the assets of the corporation or its operating 
permissions.
Let me now turn to the case of AI. As AI systems are becoming increasingly 
ubiquitous as well as powerful, there are bound to be some responsibility gaps too. 
If AI systems operate autonomously in high-stakes settings, in areas ranging from 
transportation and medicine to finance and the military, the occurrence of some 
harms is inevitable in practice.30 Just think of all the things that might go wrong with 
self-driving cars, military drones, autonomous financial trading systems, and diag-
nostic systems or helper robots in medicine. In the case of such harms, we cannot 
assume that full responsibility can always be attributed to human operators, develop-
ers, owners, or regulators. Rather, in some cases, the entirety of human responsibil-
ity may fail to do justice, intuitively speaking, to the full amount of the harm caused. 
Perhaps all humans involved—the system’s operators, developers, owners, and regu-
lators—were sufficiently diligent and acted conscientiously, and nonetheless the AI 
system caused a harm. A high level of complexity and autonomy will almost inevita-
bly go along with a certain degree of unpredictability. If the harmful outcome is one 
that would have warranted the attribution of responsibility, had it been caused by a 
human agent, then we are faced with a responsibility gap, in accordance with the 
definition above. Andreas Matthias describes the problem as follows:
“Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and 
legally) responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, 
learning machines, based on neural networks, genetic algorithms and agent 
architectures, create a new situation, where the manufacturer/operator of the 
machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behav-
iour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it. 
The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more 




(which is not a realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be 
bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription.”31
Although it is contentious whether unpredictability alone is enough to absolve 
manufacturers and operators of responsibility (I would argue it is not), AI-related 
responsibility gaps nonetheless seem possible, and so we need to take a stand on 
them. Should we insist that, beyond the responsibility that can reasonably be 
assigned to the human operators, owners, manufacturers, and regulators, there is no 
further responsibility to be assigned?32 On this view, the resulting harms would be 
on a par with those caused by a natural disaster or fluke accident. Or should we 
attribute responsibility to the AI systems themselves, thereby treating them as more 
than “merely minimal agents”? At first sight, the idea of assigning responsibility to 
an AI system may seem far-fetched and unduly anthropomorphist, but I want to sug-
gest—in line with the views of Laukyte, Solum, and others—that AI responsibility, 
like corporate responsibility, might be defensible.33
5.2  Why Corporate and AI Responsibility Cannot Be Reduced to Human 
Responsibility
Before explaining the case for AI responsibility on the model of the more familiar 
notion of corporate responsibility, it is worth addressing the objection that each of 
these purported forms of responsibility can be reduced to human responsibility. Let 
us begin with corporate responsibility. Group agents are collections of individuals. 
A group agent cannot act unless some of its members act; what a group agent does 
is determined by what the members do, under the relevant organizational structure.34 
Since the members are themselves responsible agents, so the objection goes, they 
must therefore be responsible for the group’s actions.
This objection, however, misses a key conceptual point about group agency. In 
the case of genuine group agency, as opposed to mere collective or joint action, the 
collective constitutes a new locus of agency, distinct from the agency of any of the 
individual members. The fact that those individuals causally or even constitutively 
contribute to the group’s corporate actions does not imply that those actions can 
also be agentially attributed to them. If we take the logic of group agency seriously, 
we must not treat the actions of the group agent as the actions of its members. It is 
a contingent matter whether, and how, the members are involved in a group agent’s 
actions qua responsible agents and not merely qua causal contributors or qua ingre-
dients in the group’s organizational structure, perhaps even unwittingly or involun-
tarily. Arguably, the members can be held responsible for a group agent’s actions 
only to the extent that they have played certain normatively relevant roles35:
31 See Matthias (2004, p. 175).
32 For a helpful critical discussion, I refer readers to Himmelreich (2019).
33 See, in particular, Laukyte (2014, 2017) and Solum (1992), as cited earlier. A contrary position is 
taken by Hakli and Mäkelä (2019).
34 On this “determination” or “supervenience” thesis, see List and Pettit (2006, 2011).
35 See also List and Pettit (2011, Chap. 7) and List (2019).
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• an enacting role, for instance as a knowing, willing, and uncoerced manager, 
official, or representative of the group agent,
• an authorizing role, for instance as a director, board member, owner, share-
holder, or regulator, or
• an organizational-design role, for instance as a founder, framer, policy maker, or 
institutional designer.
While the responsibility that comes with playing such roles is certainly 
important, and carefully designed structures of corporate governance as well 
as standards of professional ethics (including forms of fiduciary responsibil-
ity) may help to reinforce good conduct in those roles, there is no reason to 
expect that even the entirety of the group members’ responsibility will always 
be commensurate with the total amount of responsibility we might ideally 
like to attribute for the corporate actions.36 Thus, responsibility gaps would 
remain possible if we did not recognize corporate responsibility.37
Let me now turn to AI responsibility. Here one might raise a similar 
objection. One might argue that, since AI systems are always developed, 
built, owned, and operated by humans, AI responsibility must ultimately 
be reducible to human responsibility. Again, the objection misses a key 
point, namely that, no matter how AI systems have been brought into exist-
ence, systems above a certain threshold of autonomy constitute new loci of 
agency, distinct from the agency of any human designers, owners, and oper-
ators. In fact, such systems can arguably become even more autonomous 
than group agents. Setting aside hybrid systems such as drones operated 
by remote human pilots, AI systems do not require human participation in 
the same way in which group agents do. Once in operation, AI systems can 
potentially operate with little or no human input. Furthermore, approaches 
such as evolutionary computing might bring into existence AI systems 
that have no human designer or operator at all: they may have evolved in 
an artificial environment. And so, there is no conceptual reason to think 
36 I thank a referee for helpful comments on this point. The referee has further suggested that, since it 
is often difficult to penalize corporations beyond imposing financial sanctions on them, it might help to 
have strict professional rules barring those individuals found guilty of bad conduct from practicing in the 
future.
37 The claim that the agency (and responsibility) of a group may be irreducible to that of its members 
is sometimes backed up by formal impossibility results showing that, even if the intentional attitudes of 
the group (e.g., its beliefs, desires, preferences, or judgements) supervene on (i.e., are determined by) 
the attitudes of the group’s members, the group’s attitude on each proposition or issue will not gener-
ally be a function (such as the majority or similar) of the individual attitudes on that proposition or issue 
itself. Collective rationality (and agency) may be achievable only in the absence of “propositionwise 
supervenience”, and thus the supervenience relation between individual and group attitudes may be of a 
more complicated, “holistic” sort. In extreme cases, the group’s attitudes on some propositions or issues 
may not be shared by any individual members (List & Pettit, 2006, 2011). If those attitudes then guide 
the group’s actions, it may not always be plausible to hold the individual members responsible for them 




that the responsibility of AI systems will always be reducible to human 
responsibility.38
Think of an analogy: a person’s parents play a key causal role in making him or 
her the person he or she is, but the adult human being is nonetheless an agent dis-
tinct from his or her parents, and parents cannot normally be held responsible for 
their adult children’s conduct. Likewise, from the fact that someone—say, a system 
designer—has played a role within the causal history of an AI system, it does not 
automatically follow that this person is responsible for the system’s conduct. Rather, 
it is a contingent matter to what extent other agents—individual or corporate—are 
responsible for what an AI system does. The answer will vary from case to case. As 
in the case of group agency, human responsibility may plausibly be assigned for an 
AI system’s actions only to the extent that the relevant people have played one of the 
following roles:
• an enacting role, for instance as a knowing, willing, and uncoerced operator of 
the system,
• an authorizing role, for instance as an owner, provider, or regulator, or
• a system-design role, for instance as a creator, manufacturer, software designer, 
or policy maker.
Undoubtedly, some responsibility comes with playing these roles, including 
an ex ante responsibility to exercise due diligence before an AI system is put into 
operation and possibly an ex post responsibility in case a system causes some harm, 
depending on the situation. And just as standards of professional ethics, includ-
ing certain forms of fiduciary responsibility, may help to encourage good human 
38 As a referee has pointed out, the claim that the putative agency and responsibility of an AI system 
may be irreducible to the agency and responsibility of any human individuals is not backed up by any 
formal impossibility results analogous to those in the case of group agency (as discussed in footnote 37). 
One might therefore think that the present irreducibility claim stands on a weaker footing than the cor-
responding irreducibility claim in the corporate case. While I acknowledge that I have no formal impos-
sibility result here, I do not think this weakens the present irreducibility claim. The reason why, from 
a formal perspective, the impossibility results were needed to show that group agency is irreducible to 
individual agency is that one might reasonably hold that a group’s attitudes and actions supervene on 
individual attitudes and actions, and one might worry that this supervenience entails some kind of reduc-
ibility. The impossibility results then help to show that supervenience does not entail reducibility. By 
contrast, in the AI case, there is no reason to think that the attitudes and actions of an AI system (all the 
more so, a relatively autonomous one) supervene on the attitudes and actions of any individual human 
beings. At most, those attitudes and actions may be causally influenced by human attitudes and actions 
(such as those of the system’s designers and operators). But causation is not the same as supervenience. 
And if there is no supervenience of a system’s attitudes and actions on any human attitudes and actions, 
then the worry that, conceptually, this entails some kind of reducibility does not arise. Still, I acknowl-
edge that, as far as the connection to human attitudes and actions is concerned, the cases of group agency 
and AI are somewhat different from each other. Another way of putting this point, inspired by another 
referee’s comments, is that group agents coalesce out of human agents, while AI agents are merely typi-
cally designed and put into operation by human agents. In that sense, humans often stand in a constitu-
tive relation to group agents while they typically stand only in a causal relation to AI systems. Needless 
to say, the fact that human designers or operators causally affect AI systems means that they bear respon-
sibility for the relevant human actions, both before and after an AI system causes any harm, as discussed 
in the next paragraph of the main text.
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conduct in corporate settings, such standards may be helpful in the AI industry too. 
Crucially, however, there is no guarantee that the entirety of human responsibility 
will always be commensurate with the responsibility we would have attributed for an 
AI system’s actions if those actions had been done by a human person. Without AI 
responsibility, we therefore cannot rule out the possibility of responsibility gaps, as 
Andreas Matthias has pointed out.39
5.3  Fitness to Be Held Responsible in Group Agents and AI Systems
Attributing responsibility to corporate or artificial entities themselves would enable 
us to avoid certain responsibility gaps. But this fact alone is insufficient to establish 
that there truly is corporate or AI responsibility. It would be a mistake to derive 
the conclusion that an entity can be assigned responsibility simply from the premise 
that such an assignment helps us to avoid responsibility gaps. If a hurricane causes 
a huge amount of damage for which there is little human responsibility, it does not 
follow that the hurricane itself is a bearer of responsibility. And even if the damage 
was done by an entity with some minimal form of agency, such as a simple robot 
or a non-human animal, this is not enough to make the entity bear responsibility. 
Only entities with the right capacities could do so. Therefore, before we can assign 
responsibility to an entity, we must establish that this entity is of the right sort.
What conditions must an entity meet to be “fit to be held responsible”?40 Although 
there is some room for debate here, the following seem plausible conditions41:
Moral agency: The entity is an agent with the capacity to make normative judge-
ments about its choices—judgements about what is right and wrong, permissible 
and impermissible—and to respond appropriately to those judgements.
Knowledge: The entity has the information needed for assessing its choices nor-
matively, or at least reasonable access to such information.
Control: The entity has the control required for choosing between its options.
For the sake of my argument, I will assume that these conditions, perhaps after 
suitable fine-tuning, are necessary and sufficient for fitness to be held responsible. 
With regard to the first condition, note that intentional agency alone, without the 
capacity for normative judgements, is not enough for fitness to be held responsible. 
Non-human animals, to give the simplest example, may be intentional agents but 
lack moral agency, and indeed they cannot be bearers of responsibility. The second 
condition rules out cases in which agents, through no fault of their own, lack cer-
tain information that would be needed for a normative assessment of their choices. 
Agents who are brainwashed or trapped in an informationally deprived environment 
39 Recall Matthias (2004).
40 I am borrowing this term from Pettit (2007).
41 These conditions (also discussed in List, 2019) are adapted from List and Pettit (2011, Chap. 7), draw-





may be examples. They would not bear responsibility—certainly not full responsi-
bility—for choices made under such constraints. The third condition, finally, rules 
out responsibility in cases where agents lack control over their choices, due to exter-
nal or psychological factors. If, however, an entity meets all three conditions, as in 
the case of a typical adult human being, there seems no reason to refrain from treat-
ing that entity as a bearer of responsibility.
In general, it is an empirical question whether a given entity—biological, social, 
or electronic—meets the three conditions. Although, in the biological case, humans 
are the only known entities satisfying them, there is no conceptual reason why non-
human entities could not satisfy them too. In the case of group agents, it is widely 
accepted (especially since Peter French’s influential work on corporate responsibil-
ity) that at least some corporate entities are fit to be held responsible.42 Whether 
a particular organized collective, say a commercial corporation, meets the relevant 
requirements depends on how it is set up and organized.
A crucial issue is whether the entity is not just an intentional agent but meets 
the stronger requirements for moral agency. Well-organized corporations have pro-
cedures and mechanisms in place that allow them to make corporate-level judge-
ments about what is permissible and impermissible, and to act on those judgements. 
Indeed, many organizations have compliance departments and ethics committees.43 
Such entities are what Philip Pettit calls “conversable”44: we can engage with them 
and challenge their actions on the basis of normative reasons, not unlike the way we 
engage with adult human beings.45 This is very different from the way we engage 
with, say, a non-intentional physical process or a non-human animal. The latter 
kinds of entities are not capable of normative reasoning. We can causally interact 
with them, but we cannot influence them by giving them normative reasons, and 
they would not be able to give us reason-based justifications for their behaviour.
The present observations suggest a plausible regulatory requirement for the crea-
tion and operation of powerful group agents in society.
A proposal: Society, via its regulatory authorities, should permit the creation and 
operation of powerful group agents, such as corporations and other organizations 
in high-stakes settings, only if structures are in place to ensure their fitness to be 
held responsible for their corporate actions.46
42 Recall the references in footnote 25.
43 For recent discussions of corporate moral agency, see Björnsson and Hess (2017) and Pasternak 
(2017).
44 See, e.g., Pettit (2001).
45 As noted by a referee, one might wonder whether the conversability of an organization—if there is 
any—is only of a rather derivative sort, i.e., derived from the conversability of the organization’s human 
members. In other words, the organization may be responsive to normative reasons only because, and 
to the extent that, some of its members are. Be that as it may, however, what matters for the organiza-
tion’s moral agency is that there is conversability at the corporate level, irrespective of how exactly this is 
organizationally implemented. Arguably, conversability, like agency itself, is a multiply realizable prop-
erty, and different mechanisms might be employed to implement it in a collective entity.
46 Along similar lines, a “developmental rationale” for holding group agents responsible is defended in 
List and Pettit (2011, Chap. 7).
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The idea is that an organization, if operative in a “high-stakes setting” according 
to society’s criteria, would attain its official incorporated status and operating licence 
only if it can show that it has procedures and mechanisms in place that ensure that it 
satisfies the three conditions stated above and that it therefore qualifies as a respon-
sible moral agent. Depending on what is at stake, society may further impose precise 
restrictions on what the organization is or is not allowed to do and demand that the 
organization should have appropriate financial assets and/or insurance arrangements 
such that it can be fined or made to pay compensation in cases of wrongdoing. In 
this way, society can protect itself against problematic responsibility gaps.
Moving on to artificial intelligence, I suggest that, here too, it is an empiri-
cal question whether a given system satisfies the conditions for fitness to be held 
responsible. Obviously, first-generation AI systems do not come close, and even if 
goal-directed behaviour is common in AI systems, there is still a big gap between 
mere intentional agency and moral agency. The emerging research programme of 
“engineering moral machines” is an attempt to implement moral agency in AI sys-
tems: to develop AI systems that behave morally.47
There is a pressing need to ensure that AI systems do not just pursue certain 
pre-programmed goals mechanically, but that they comply with moral norms. It 
is inevitable that autonomous systems in high-stakes settings will sometimes be 
confronted with decisions requiring moral judgement. For an often-cited example, 
think of a self-driving car that has a choice between hitting a child on the road 
and swerving with the consequence of damaging the mirror of a parked vehicle 
or mildly injuring its own passengers. Given the vast number of different possible 
such situations, it is not feasible to provide the car with a complete list of defini-
tive instructions in advance. Moral guidelines cannot be exhaustively enumerated 
like this. Rather, the car must have the capacity to assess the relevant situations 
autonomously and to arrive at reasonable moral decisions on its own. In short, it 
must engage in normative reasoning and achieve a certain form of moral agency.
It should be clear that, while there are significant technical challenges here, con-
ceptually, there is no reason why an AI system could not qualify as a moral agent 
and, in addition, satisfy the knowledge and control conditions I have stated. Even if 
existing AI systems do not yet meet these requirements, there is no reason to think 
that having an electronic or otherwise engineered hardware is an in-principle bar-
rier to their satisfaction. If we acknowledge that group agents can qualify as fit to be 
held responsible, then we should be prepared to acknowledge that AI systems can do 
so too, at least in principle. In fact, if I am right that group agents can be viewed as 
socially implemented AI systems, then the familiar notion of corporate responsibil-
ity can already be viewed as an existing example of AI responsibility.
In analogy to the regulatory requirement that I have endorsed in the case of group agents, 
one might propose a similar requirement for AI systems, albeit in slightly amended form:
A proposal: Society, via its regulatory authorities, should permit the use of auton-
omous AI systems in high-stakes settings only if structures are in place to ensure 
47 See, e.g., Broersen (2014) and Fisher et al. (2016). For an overview of the debate on artificial moral 




these systems’—or at least their legal representatives’—fitness to be held responsi-
ble for their actions.
The idea is that the operating licence for any AI system in what is deemed a “high-
stakes setting” would be contingent on evidence that the system meets the conditions 
for fitness to be held responsible and/or that there is a full transfer of responsibility 
to certain legal representatives. The proposed form of AI responsibility may, in turn, 
have to be underwritten by certain assets, financial guarantees, and/or insurance, so 
that, in the event of a harm, the system or its legal representatives can be made to 
pay appropriate fines and compensation. Of course, society would have to decide what 
counts as a “high-stakes setting” for regulatory purposes. The use of powerful AI sys-
tems in such settings would then be prohibited by the relevant regulators unless these 
systems properly function as loci of responsible agency themselves or there is a full 
transfer of responsibility to their human legal representatives as a backup.48
As in the case of group agents, this regulatory approach would enable society to 
protect itself against responsibility gaps. It is important that we avoid a situation in 
which individuals or corporate entities can evade liability for high-risk decisions by 
delegating those decisions to AI systems and then hiding behind the autonomy and 
unforeseeability of those systems’ behaviour. In a slogan, it should not be possible to 
achieve impunity for harmful actions just because “the algorithm did it”.
To implement moral agency in AI systems, we would have to design those sys-
tems explicitly to have ethical decision-making capacities, in the same way in which 
corporations may be required to have ethical compliance mechanisms. This can be 
technically achieved in at least two ways: either by pre-programming certain moral 
constraints into the AI system or by training the system to recognize morally signifi-
cant situations and to adjudicate them autonomously.49 The first, constraint-based 
approach would require the codification of the relevant moral norms in a machine-
implementable format and programming those norms explicitly into the AI system. 
The second, training-based approach would require the use of machine-learning 
techniques to recognize patterns in a database of illustrative moral decisions and to 
extrapolate those patterns to future decisions, just as AI systems can learn to recog-
nize patterns on chest X-rays, given a sufficiently large database of images paired 
with corresponding diagnoses (an instance of “supervised learning”). For instance, 
a self-driving car might be trained using a database of thousands of traffic situations 
paired with information about the morally desirable response in each situation.
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. Under the constraint-
based approach, it may be easier to verify in advance that the system will be 
48 In line with this, Sparrow (2007) argues against the use of certain forms of military AI technology. He 
writes: “the more autonomous these systems become, the less it will be possible to properly hold those 
who designed them or ordered their use responsible for their actions. Yet the impossibility of punish-
ing the machine means that we cannot hold the machine responsible. We can insist that the officer who 
orders their use be held responsible for their actions, but only at the cost of allowing that they should 
sometimes be held entirely responsible for actions over which they had no control. For the foreseeable 
future then, the deployment of weapon systems controlled by artificial intelligences in warfare is […] 
unfair either to potential casualties […] or to the officer who will be held responsible for their use” (pp. 
74–75).
49 For the distinction, see Fisher et al. (2016, p. 468).
1230
1 3
Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence 
norm-compliant, but as moral philosophers recognize, the systematic codification of 
moral norms is extremely difficult. Under the training approach, it may be easier to 
emulate human moral judgements, provided the training database is large enough, 
but it is harder to verify the system’s reliability in advance. In short, there may be a 
trade-off between verifiability and moral adequacy. More research is needed to make 
progress here.
A further strategy, beyond engineering AI systems to behave morally, is to require 
that AI systems be equipped with an “ethical black box”, as proposed by Alan Winfield 
and Marina Jirotka.50 This is “the equivalent of a Flight Data Recorder to continuously 
record sensor and relevant internal status data”. It enables investigators to reconstruct 
the AI system’s internal decision-making process in the context of any accident.51 Win-
field and Jirotka argue that this is “an essential part of establishing accountability and 
responsibility” in robots and autonomous systems, and that “without the transparency 
afforded by an ethical black box, [such] systems are unlikely to win public trust”.52
Finally, in those cases in which it is unrealistic to turn AI systems into genuinely 
responsible agents but we still wish to use such systems, it may be appropriate to intro-
duce a regime of strict liability for their operation, akin to strict-liability regimes in 
other industries, such as the food industry. Under a strict-liability regime, the owners 
or operators of any AI system would be liable for any harms done by the system, even 
if no fault, negligence, or intention by those owners or operators can be established. 
A strict-liability regime might plausibly incentivize the development of AI systems 
that are as safe as possible, and it would be likely to prompt owners and operators to 
purchase insurance to cover any residual risks. However, it is important for society to 
decide if (and when) AI systems should ever be admitted as genuine decision-makers 
in high-stakes settings if they do not display at least a modicum of moral agency.53
50 See Winfield and Jirotka (2017).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 A referee has raised the possibility that the actions of AI systems may give rise to a form of responsibility 
in the sense of the private law even if their agency falls short of full moral agency. The referee writes: “In 
private law, and more particularly in the private law of negligence which concerns the responsibility (and 
liability) of one party to another for the effects of some wrongdoing, it is well established that the standard 
for judging the defendant’s conduct as wrongful is objective, not subjective … Of course, the defendant must 
still have exercised his (intentional) agency; after all, it is agency and not some mere misfortune that is being 
objectively assessed. But … the judgment of agency falls short of being a moral judgment of the defend-
ant considered on his own … And this is what leaves open, it seems, the possibility that an AI agent, even 
if non-conversable or less accessible to moral reasons, might still be the sort of entity that can attract legal 
responsibility.” The referee notes further that this suggests that a non-conversable AI agent can “be a conduit 
for the vicarious legal responsibility (and liability) of those (owners or users) that deploy the AI agent for the 
advancement of their own purposes … For vicarious legal responsibility to attach to the AI deployer it might 
well be enough (for closing off the responsibility gap) if the AI can (and does) act in an objectively unreason-
able way in the advancement of the deployer’s own purposes.” Conversable moral agency on the part of the 
AI system is not needed for this. The referee, finally, suggests that “given the similarities under this account 
of vicarious legal responsibility between, on the one hand, the group agent corporate employer acting by 
way of its (human) employee members and, on the other hand, the (possibly human) owner/deployer acting 
by way of its non-human AI agent, both for the advancement of the employer/deployer’s own purposes, the 
account seems to lend itself very nicely to the analogy from group to AI agency and responsibility that the 
author develops in this paper.” A lot more could be said about this possibility of legal responsibility without 




The bottom line is that, in the case of AI as much as in the case of group agency, 
careful regulation is needed to avoid situations in which problematic responsibility 
gaps can occur by accident or in which risky decisions are delegated to non-human 
decision-makers in order to minimize human responsibility for any harms. AI sys-
tems that qualify as responsible moral agents, like corporate moral agents, might, in 
turn, achieve what Philip Pettit calls “conversability”: we would be able to scrutinize 
and seek justifications for their actions through the lens of normative reasons, rather 
than merely engage with them in a causal or mechanical manner.54
6  Challenges Related to Rights and Moral Status
6.1  Corporate and AI Rights and Legal Personhood
If we regard some corporate entities and AI systems as moral agents who are fit to be 
held responsible, should we also give them rights?55 Should we agree, for instance, 
with the Citizens United decision of the US Supreme Court, which gives relatively 
broad free-speech rights—exercisable via monetary spending—to commercial cor-
porations and other organizations? And should we then extend those rights to AI 
systems, a serious question in a world of Twitter bots and automated contributors to 
social media feeds? Moreover, should we treat group agents and AI systems as per-
sons of their own, akin in some respects to human persons?
At first sight, the idea of giving rights not just to corporations but also to AI sys-
tems may seem preposterous, and the idea that such entities could attain some kind 
of moral status seems even more far-fetched. However, consider the functions per-
formed by corporate entities in modern societies: the state provides vital services, 
law-enforcement agencies uphold the law, universities educate people, and corpora-
tions and banks—despite some of their negative aspects—play important roles in 
the economy. It is widely recognized that those entities would not be able to perform 
those functions if they did not have at least some rights (carefully circumscribed 
rights, of course) and some associated legal status: the right to own property, the 
right to employ people and to enter contracts, the right to demand the fulfilment of 
54 I have suggested that the criteria for moral agency in an AI system, such as conversability, are struc-
turally similar to those in a group agent. If one took the view (as briefly discussed in footnote 45) that 
group agents are able to achieve conversability only because they consist of conversable human individu-
als, then this might point towards a possible obstacle for the design of a conversable AI system, as noted 
by a referee. After all, the AI system, being an artefact, has no human members from whose capacities 
the system’s conversability could derive. As noted in footnote 45, however, conversability is arguably 
a multiply realizable property, and its implementation would simply require a different mechanism in 
the case of an AI system than in the case of a group agent. I am not claiming that truly conversable AI 
systems already exist. Indeed, implementing moral agency in an AI system is difficult (cf. Fisher et al., 
2016). All I am suggesting is that if future AI systems are to qualify as full-blown moral agents, they 
would need to display appropriate forms of conversability.
55 For earlier discussions of these questions in the corporate case, see, e.g., List and Pettit (2011), and in 
the AI case, see Solum (1992), Laukyte (2014, 2017), and Turner (2018). Solum and Turner discuss the 
case for legal personhood for AI, noting the parallel with corporations, and Laukyte argues that the “per-
formative” (or functionalist) case for granting personhood to group agents considered in List and Pettit 
(2011) essentially carries over to AI systems.
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certain obligations by others and to sue non-compliant parties in court, and so on. 
Indeed, corporate entities are routinely considered legal persons, and it is this status 
that qualifies them as bearers of legal responsibilities and as holders of certain legal 
rights. To be sure, legal personhood is not the same as moral personhood, but it is an 
important status nonetheless.
Analogously, we may wonder whether a similar legal status should be extended 
to AI systems, as they play increasingly important roles in our complex world. Per-
haps some of those systems, too, will be able to perform some of their functions—
especially future functions—only if they have a certain legal status and even certain 
rights, a possibility already entertained by Solum in the early 1990s.56 Presumably, 
we need to regulate the decision-making powers of AI systems in financial, medi-
cal, and military contexts. We need to specify, for instance, whether autonomous 
systems in business contexts may enter valid contracts, whether medical systems 
may prescribe medicines and perform treatments, and whether military systems may 
make certain decisions autonomously in critical situations.
Along these lines, a 2017 European Parliament report on legal and ethical aspects 
of robotics recommends that the European Commission should explore the possibil-
ity of:
“creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the 
most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the sta-
tus of electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may 
cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots 
make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties indepen-
dently”.57
Supporters of this proposal suggest that it would be appropriate in light of the 
ever-growing range of functions performed by autonomous systems in modern 
societies. As a commentator puts it, the proposed status “could allow robots to be 
insured individually and be held liable for damages if they go rogue and start hurt-
ing people or damaging property.” And further: “Legal personhood would not make 
robots virtual people who can get married and benefit from human rights …; it 
would merely put them on par with corporations, which already have status as ‘legal 
persons,’ and are treated as such by courts around the world.”58 Critics object that 
the proposal is premature, and that “[b]y seeking legal personhood for robots, manu-
facturers were merely trying to absolve themselves of responsibility for the actions 
of their machines”.59
However, even if we gave legal personhood to AI systems, this would not absolve 
relevant humans—operators, manufacturers, owners, or regulators—of responsibil-
ity any more than giving legal personhood to corporations absolves directors, man-
agers, and relevant employees of individual responsibility. Even if certain corporate 
56 See Solum (1992).
57 See http:// www. europ arl. europa. eu/ sides/ getDoc. do? pubRe f=-// EP// TEXT+ REPORT+ A8- 
2017- 0005+0+ DOC+ XML+ V0// EN.
58 See Delcker (2018). On AI legal personhood, see also Turner (2018).




or electronic entities are treated as legal persons, human beings may still be held 
responsible to an appropriate extent for those entities’ actions—namely to the extent 
that they have played certain normatively relevant roles, such as enacting, authoriz-
ing, or design roles, as discussed earlier.
To make progress in the debate on whether corporate rights and personhood 
should be extended to AI systems, we need to say more about what granting rights 
and/or personhood to an entity means and what the justification could be.
6.2  Rights and Personhood, Legal and Moral
Whenever we speak of “rights”, we must clarify at least two things. First, we must 
clarify whether we are referring to legal rights or to moral ones. To illustrate this 
distinction, note that people living under a dictatorial regime have far weaker legal 
rights than people living in a liberal democracy, but we think that their moral rights 
are the same, even if these moral rights are not respected in their society. Second, 
we must clarify whether we are referring to rights in a thin sense, understood simply 
as (i) deontic powers or permissions to do or claim certain things, or to rights in a 
richer sense, understood as (ii) a status in which those deontic powers or permis-
sions are grounded and by reference to which they are justified.60 Let me call (i) 
the “deontic” sense of rights, and (ii) the “status” sense. Saying that someone has a 
right in the deontic sense is just another way of saying that this person has certain 
deontic powers or permissions. It carries no implication as to what the grounds of 
those powers or permissions are and how they are justified. By contrast, when we 
are referring to a right in the status sense, for instance, a natural right, a human right, 
or an animal right, then we are saying something about the grounds, or the justifica-
tion, of the relevant powers or permissions.
Similarly, the term “personhood” can be used in different senses. It can stand 
either for a legal status or for a moral one. Legal personhood consists in having a 
certain package of legal powers, permissions, and responsibilities, but it need not 
come with any special moral status. Legal persons need not have any intrinsic moral 
significance. Moral personhood, by contrast, is not a legal status but a moral one. 
It entails a package of moral powers, permissions, and responsibilities, and comes 
with a certain intrinsic moral significance. Moral persons are objects of moral con-
cern; they matter intrinsically.
With these clarifications in place, we can see that, even if we grant legal person-
hood and legal rights to corporate entities and/or AI systems, this does not imply 
granting them moral personhood and moral rights. Moreover, giving certain deontic 
powers and permissions to corporate or artificial entities does not imply that these 
entities have intrinsic moral significance. They might be granted those powers and 
permissions for purely instrumental reasons, for instance because this helps them to 
perform certain useful functions in society. And they might be denied other powers 
and permissions, also for instrumental reasons.
Let me use the term “non-derivative rights” to refer to deontic powers or permis-
sions (whether legal or moral) that are justified by reference to an entity’s intrinsic 
60 For a closely related distinction, see Valentini (2018).
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moral significance, as in the case of human rights and (arguably) animal rights, and 
let me use the term “derivative rights” to refer to deontic powers or permissions that 
are justified in more indirect, typically instrumental way, for instance by reference 
to some other values or goods they promote. For instance, a university has certain 
rights—to enter contracts, to engage in certain forms of speech, and so on—in this 
derivative sense. These rights are not justified by reference to the university’s stand-
ing as a moral person or its intrinsic significance, which it arguably does not have, 
but rather by reference to the functions the university performs in society. In order 
for a university to fulfil its mission, which is in society’s interest, it needs to be able 
to employ staff, enter contracts, own buildings and equipment, and so on. The uni-
versity’s derivative rights and standing as a legal person enable it to do these things 
effectively. What I want to suggest is this:
A proposal: (i) Corporate and AI entities may be given derivative rights and legal 
personhood under certain circumstances, but no non-derivative rights or full-
blown moral personhood. (ii) The criterion for deciding whether to grant certain 
derivative rights (as well as legal personhood) to such entities should be whether 
this promotes the interests of those of who matter intrinsically, paradigmatically 
human beings but perhaps also other living creatures.61
Under this proposal, it becomes a contingent issue whether the assignment of 
certain rights and legal personhood to AI systems can be justified. The issue boils 
down to the question of whether having AI rights and legal personhood helps to 
promote the interests of those who matter intrinsically, especially human beings. If 
the answer is yes, then AI rights and legal personhood can be justified; if the answer 
is no, then not. I suspect that, as long as AI systems have only limited autonomy and 
limited agential capacities, the answer is no. However, with increases in the auton-
omy and agential capacities of such systems, the answer could become yes, with 
the resulting rights carefully delimited.62 I believe that the present proposal, as well 
as the recognition of the distinction between non-derivative and derivative rights, 
could take some of the heat out of the debate about AI rights and personhood. The 
case for or against AI rights and legal personhood is structurally similar to the one 
for or against corporate rights and legal personhood.
6.3  Could There ever Be a Case for Giving Non‑derivative Rights and a Full‑blown 
Moral Status to Group Agents or AI Systems?
I have emphasized that although group agents and AI systems can qualify as inten-
tional agents and perhaps even as moral agents who are fit to be held responsible, 
their status is still very different from that of humans and—I would add—non-human 
61 The corporate version of this proposal is in line with List and Pettit (2011, Chap. 8).
62 Solum (1992, pp. 1257–1258) makes a version of this point, noting that if “granting AIs [for example] 
freedom of speech [had] the best consequences for humans” (perhaps “because this action would pro-
mote the production of useful information”), then this would be an “easy justification” for giving certain 




animals. The difference, I have assumed, lies in the fact that human beings and some 
non-human animals matter intrinsically, while group agents and AI systems do not. 
Accordingly, only humans and perhaps some other animals can have non-derivative 
rights and the relevant moral status, while group agents and AI systems can have, at 
most, derivative rights and a thinner legal status. But even if this differential treat-
ment seems commonsensical, is it philosophically defensible?63
If we thought that an entity’s moral status was grounded in that entity’s agential 
capacities, then we would have to conclude that similar agential capacities—wher-
ever they occur—imply a similar moral status. And so, if group agents or AI systems 
were to display the same agential capacities as humans, we would have to extend the 
same rights and moral status to them. To be sure, the agential capacities of current cor-
porate and AI entities fall short of human ones. But this is an empirical fact, which 
might change with new technological or social developments. The upshot would be that 
(hypothetical or future) group agents or AI systems with agential capacities similar to 
those of humans would be entitled to rights and a moral status similar to that of humans.
If we find this conclusion problematic and wish to defend the claim that even 
group agents or AI systems with very sophisticated capacities should not have the 
same moral status as humans, we must find some distinguishing feature—beyond 
agential capacities—that accounts for the difference in status. The feature would 
have to be one which human beings unambiguously satisfy, and which group agents 
and AI systems unambiguously violate. Simply taking membership of the human 
species as a necessary condition for intrinsic moral significance would be rather 
stipulative and ad hoc, and it would amount to a philosophically unsatisfactory form 
of “human supremacism”, as Will Kymlicka has argued in another context.64 Among 
other things, it would run the risk of “throw[ing] animals under the bus”.65 For 
instance, we may plausibly wish to extend non-derivative rights and an appropri-
ate moral status to the great apes as well. What we need is a criterion that excludes 
group agents and AI systems from having such rights and status, while including all 
human beings and also making room for the possibility that some non-human ani-
mals could have non-derivative rights as well. My suggestion is the following:
A proposal: A necessary (though perhaps not by itself sufficient) condition for having 
non-derivative rights and intrinsic moral significance is having phenomenal conscious-
ness or at least having the potential for phenomenal consciousness. To have phenome-
nal consciousness, in turn, is to be an entity that has subjective experiences: there must 
be something it is like to be that entity, as Thomas Nagel famously puts it.66
63 On this debate in the corporate case, see also Pasternak (2017) and Silver (2018), who argues for 
extending a certain moral status to corporations. In the AI case, see again Solum (1992).
64 See Kymlicka (2017).
65 Ibid., pp. 769 and 779.
66 See Nagel (1974). For earlier discussions of this condition for non-derivative rights in the contexts of 
artificial intelligence and group agency, see, respectively, Solum (1992) and List (2018). Emphatically, 
the suggestion is that consciousness (its presence or the potential for it) is necessary for having non-
derivative rights and intrinsic moral significance. The suggestion is not that consciousness is necessary 
for fitness to be held responsible or for having derivative rights (such as rights justifiable by reference to 
their instrumental value for human society).
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This condition is very inclusive. It is satisfied by all human beings,67 and we can 
safely assume that it is satisfied by many other sentient animals too, from chimpan-
zees to cats, dogs, and bats (as Nagel points out), though there could be some further 
necessary conditions for having non-derivative rights that some or many non-human 
animals do not satisfy. In any case, the inclusiveness of the proposed condition is 
desirable. When it comes to deciding which entities are at least candidates for having 
rights and intrinsic moral significance, we ought to err on the side of inclusiveness 
rather than exclusiveness. At the same time, as intended, the proposed condition is 
not satisfied by group agents or by current AI systems. We have very good reasons 
to think that neither group agents nor current-generation AI systems have anything 
close to phenomenal consciousness or the potential for it. Satisfying the conditions 
for intentional agency—even for moral agency—is not the same as having first-per-
son subjective experiences. Intentional agency, and moral agency as I have charac-
terized it here, can be viewed as “functionalist” phenomena—phenomena that lend 
themselves to a third-personal scientific study—while phenomenal consciousness, 
by being first-personal, is not like this. Phenomenal consciousness is logically dis-
tinct from, and goes beyond, intentional or moral agency.68 The arguments I have 
offered so far only support the claim that functionalist properties such as intentional 
or moral agency may be present in group agents or in advanced AI systems.
The main reason for believing that neither group agents nor current AI systems 
have phenomenal consciousness is that the kinds of physical conditions which, 
according to recent neuroscience, are associated with phenomenal consciousness 
and which can be found in the brains of mammals, are not present in corporate insti-
tutional structures or in the conventional computer systems underlying existing AI 
technologies. In particular, we have reason to believe the following:
An empirical premise: Consciousness occurs only in highly integrated informa-
tion-processing systems with massive internal high-bandwidth feedback mecha-
nisms, of the kind we find in the mammalian cortex. This special kind of informa-
tional integration is nowhere to be found in existing corporations or conventional 
computers.69
This is certainly not a conceptual truth, but it is an empirical claim that seems 
supported by our current best neuroscientific understanding of the correlates of 
consciousness.
Now comes an important, albeit very hypothetical point: if there ever were cor-
porate entities or AI systems exhibiting the consciousness-supporting physical con-
ditions—such as highly integrated information-processing with high-bandwidth 
67 For instance, babies undeniably have the potential for phenomenal consciousness (whether actualized 
or not), as do comatose patients, provided there is some chance they will regain consciousness. To make 
the criterion even more inclusive, we might extend the notion of “potential” to include “past potential” as 
well.
68 See, e.g., Chalmers (1996).
69 I am here relying on integrated information theory (e.g., Tononi & Koch, 2015), though other theories 
of consciousness (including the neural synchronization theory defended in Crick and Koch, 1990) might 




internal feedback, on a par with what goes on in a mammalian cortex—then we 
would have to conclude that those entities have the potential for phenomenal con-
sciousness. And so, they could become candidates for having intrinsic moral signifi-
cance and non-derivative rights, at least as far as the proposed necessary condition 
is concerned. I consider this a very hypothetical scenario, but it is worth reflecting 
about it for a moment.
In the corporate case, it seems unlikely that we could ever design an organized 
collective—a corporation or similar—in such a way as to replicate the kind of mas-
sively integrated information processing characteristic of a biological cortex.70 Con-
ceivably—though this is philosophically controversial—the so-called China brain 
thought experiment, described by Ned Block, might illustrate a phenomenally con-
scious collective.71 In this thought experiment, each member of a very large pop-
ulation (say, billions) is given the task of simulating the behaviour of one neuron 
in a biological brain, and the appropriate neural connectivity is then achieved via 
something like the internet. But existing corporate structures do not remotely resem-
ble anything like this, and so we can set the possibility aside as speculative science 
fiction.
In the AI case, however, the situation is potentially different. Even though current 
AI technologies do not appear to instantiate the consciousness-supporting physi-
cal conditions, technologies such as biological or biomorphic computing, in which 
computer systems are built around a neural-network structure, might plausibly sup-
port the kind of massively integrated information processing that appears to under-
pin consciousness in a biological cortex. If this is so, then we cannot rule out the 
possibility of phenomenally conscious AI from the outset. Indeed, scientific projects 
such as the EU-funded Brain Simulation Project are attempts—albeit controversial 
ones—to create a reasonably faithful computer simulation of a human brain.72 If 
my analysis is right, then such projects and similar developments, if technically suc-
cessful, could have serious ethical implications. Future AI systems with brain-like 
features might have the potential for phenomenal consciousness, and so they might 
become candidates for having intrinsic moral significance and some non-derivative 
rights.73 In ethical terms, this is completely uncharted territory.
7  The Bigger Picture
Traditionally, we have tended to assume that human beings are the primary—or 
even only—powerful agents occupying the social world and that, although non-
human animals can be intentional agents too, moral agency is a uniquely human 
phenomenon. Furthermore, we have tended to assume—especially outside animal-
rights or deep-ecology circles—that human beings are the only entities that have 
70 See List (2018). Cf. Schwitzgebel (2015).
71 See Block (1980).
72 See https:// www. human brain proje ct. eu/ en/ brain- simul ation/. For critical discussions of the project and 
the feasibility of its original ambitions, see Nature (2015) and Yong (2019).
73 Basl and Schwitzgebel (2019) have independently made a similar point.
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intrinsic moral significance and non-derivative rights, so that the class of moral 
agents and the class of those with intrinsic moral significance do not come apart 
too significantly.74 Arguably, the latter class (of beings with intrinsic moral signifi-
cance) is larger than the former (of moral agents), since there are some humans, 
such as new-born babies or people with certain impairments, who do not currently 
meet all the functional conditions for the full exercise of moral agency but who, 
of course, have rights and entitlements as well as intrinsic moral significance. And 
many of us would further wish to include some non-human animals in the class of 
beings with intrinsic moral significance. That said, our established moral codes are 
relatively anthropocentric, and the philosophical quest to identify the conditions for 
moral agency and the grounds of an entity’s moral status has largely boiled down to 
finding a good justification for the status quo or perhaps some more enlightened ver-
sion of it.75
As my discussion, like earlier discussions of group agency and AI in the litera-
ture, should illustrate, the arrival of new complex intentional agents—whether cor-
porate or artificial—raises several challenges for the status quo:
Additional powerful agents: The class of powerful agents occupying the social 
world and making high-stakes decisions may increasingly include a variety of 
non-human entities, corporate or artificial.
New responsibility gaps: If we do not carefully implement the kinds of reg-
ulatory proposals sketched above—making sure that powerful corporate and 
artificial agents are designed to satisfy the requirements for fitness to be held 
responsible—we run the risk that certain high-stakes decisions are made by 
intentional systems that are unaccountable. This may create new responsibil-
ity gaps.
Moral agents without intrinsic moral significance: While traditionally all 
moral agents have been human and thus entities with intrinsic moral significance, 
some new moral agents—corporate or artificial—may come into existence which 
lack such a moral status and matter only derivatively.
Non-human users of morality: While, traditionally, moral principles and theo-
ries have always been developed for a human audience—with humans as their 
target users—we will now need to develop moral principles and theories for some 
non-human users: corporate entities and AI systems. This raises the question of 
whether our largely anthropocentric moral codes are fit for purpose or whether 
the fact that the addressees of morality may include non-human entities changes 
the way in which moral principles and theories should be formulated, codified, 
and transmitted.
New entities with intrinsic moral significance: In case phenomenally conscious 
AI systems ever come into existence, we might need to recognize such entities 
as candidates for having intrinsic moral significance and certain non-derivative 
rights—an entirely new situation. We must also ask which norms and standards 
govern the permissibility of bringing such entities into existence.
74 On animal rights, see, e.g., Gruen (2017).




All this suggests that our moral theories and regulatory frameworks should be 
“future-proofed”: they need to be reassessed with a view to making them adequate 
even in a world in which some of these challenges materialize. This might require 
a wider “reflective equilibrium” in our thinking about agency, moral status, and the 
function of morality for regulating behaviour. Undoubtedly, this paper has flagged 
more questions than it has answered. But these questions should have a firm place 
on our agenda for discussion, and my programmatic aim has been to make them 
more salient: we must give greater attention to the ways in which group agency and 
artificial intelligence introduce new loci of agency into our social world.
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